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Defeating a Motion to Dismiss a Franchise Case in Federal Court
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| Guest post by: Mitchell J. Kassoff |
Article Overview: A motion to dismiss a complaint in federal court is a relatively inexpensive method to terminate litigation against a defendant. It has the advantage of not revealing the strategy of the defendant’s case while putting the plaintiff in the position of losing his case at the very beginning of litigation. If the defendant loses his motion to dismiss the complaint, he has lost virtually nothing, while the loss of the motion by the plaintiff is devastating. While a motion to dismiss the case can be appealed, the better course of action is to prevail at the district court level. Therefore, a plaintiff must make all possible efforts to defeat this motion.
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Defeating a Motion to Dismiss a Franchise Case in Federal Court
Franchising (General)
Franchising is regulated by the Federal Trade Commission
pursuant to its rule (“FTC Rule”).1 Some
states have enacted statutes concerning franchising.2 Some have enacted regulations concerning
franchising, 3 and some have enacted special industry laws.4 In franchise cases
a plaintiff must be certain to allege all of the requirements in the state
franchise statute to survive a motion to dismiss the complaint. Quite simply, review the statute and be
certain to have an allegation covering each requirement. Many states also have regulations covering
franchising. These regulations should
also be reviewed to ensure that there is an allegation covering each
requirement.
Franchising (Fraud in
the Inducement)
It is quite possible that the franchisee will allege fraud
in the inducement in his complaint. The
franchisor will most likely have an integration clause in the franchise
agreement. The franchisee will have to show why the integration clause should
not be given effect.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states that malice,
intent, knowledge and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred
generally. Rule 9 should be considered
in light of the spirit of modern federal pleading as summed up in Rule 8(a) and
8(e), which emphasize that pleading should be short, concise and direct. United States v. Kralmann, 3 F.R.D. 473 (D.
Ky. 1943), United States v. Dittrich, 3 F.R.D. 475 (D. Ky. 1943).
Rule 9 must also be construed in conjunction with Rule 8,
which says a complaint is not required to plead evidence. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975). Rule 9 is not to be read as
exception to Rule 8(a) but rather in conjunction with this rule. Brown v. Joiner International Inc., 523 F.
Supp. 333 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
In Golden v. Mobil Oil Corp., 882 F.2d 490 (11th Cir. 1989),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that:
Procedural unconscionability
exists when the individualized circumstances surrounding the transaction reveal
that there was no “real and voluntary meeting of the minds” of the2 © 2006
West, a Thomson business. Franchise & Distribution contracting
parties. Kohl, 398 So. 2d at 868
(quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp.264 (E.D. Mich. 1976)). 882 F.2d at 493.
In Durham v. Business Management Associates, 847 F.2d 1505
(11th Cir. 1988), which involved a motion for summary judgment, the 11th
Circuit held that:
The application of the rule
[9(b)], however, must not abrogate the concept of notice pleading. Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.
1985); see also Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Weaver, 780 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.
1986). Allegations of date, time or
place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the alleged
fraud must be pleaded with particularity, but alternative means are also
available to satisfy the rule. Seville,
742 F.2d at 791; Shared Network Technologies Inc. v. Taylor, 669 F.Supp. 422
(N.D. Ga. 1987). 847 F.2d at 1511-12.
In Ziemba v. Cascade International Inc., 256 F.3d 1194(11th
Cir. 2001), which dealt with a securities fraud case, the 11th Circuit held that
“[m]alice, intent, knowledge and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally.” 256 F.3d at
1202. [Emphasis added]. This has been followed in the complaint.
Franchising (Uniform
Franchise Offering Circular)
In many cases the franchisee believes that the franchisor
has not prepared a proper Uniform Franchise Offering Circular and that he
should be able to obtain relief on that basis.
An examination of the FTC Rule appears to show that there is a private
cause of action to enforce this statute.
The Federal Trade Commission expressed its view when the FTC
Rule was issued that private actions should be permitted by the courts for Rule
violations. 5 To date, no federal court has permitted a private action for Rule
violations. 6 Therefore, if a motion is made to dismiss a complaint as to a
count alleging a violation of the FTC Rule, it will most likely be granted.
Motion to Dismiss
(General Requirements)
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply
requires “a short and plain statement of claim” showing pleader is entitled to
relief. All a complaint needs to do is
afford a defendant fair notice of a plaintiff’s claim and grounds upon which it
rests. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857
(6th Cir. 1976); McDonald v. General Mills Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Cal.
1974), Friends of the Earth v. Carey 401F. Supp. 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affirmed
in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976);
Harbert v Rapp, 415 F. Supp. 83 (W.D. Okla. 1976);Leeward Petroleum Ltd. v.
Mene Grande Oil Co., 415 F. Supp 158 (Del. 1976); Lucas v. Park Chrysler
Plymouth Inc., 62 F.R.D. 399 (Ill. 1974), and Western Colorado Fruit Growers
Association v. Marshall, 473 F. Supp. 693 (Colo.1979). To ensure that a plaintiff will survive a motion
to dismiss, the complaint should be drafted so that all aspects of the case are
apparent from the four corners of the document.
Only a month ago the 11th Circuit held that “[t]he threshold
of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim is, as we have stated previously, ‘exceedingly
low.’ Ancata v. Prison Health Servs.
Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985), (citing Quality Foods de Centro America
S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Development, 711 F.2d 989 (11th Cir.
1983)).” Financial Security Assurance
Inc. v. Stephens Inc., (11th Cir. May 31, 2006) at *8-9. [Emphasis added].
The 2d Circuit in the well-known case Twombly v. Bell
Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2005), (an appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court has been filed), reversed and remanded the District Court’s order
to dismiss the case in question. The 2d
Circuit said:
We review de novo the dismissal
of a complaint for failure to state a claim, accepting as true all facts
alleged in the complaint and drawing all inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d
191 (2d Cir. 2001). “A complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim ‘unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim, which
would entitle him to relief.’” Id. at 197-98 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957)). “At the pleading stage
… the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan
Guar. Trust Co. Of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004), (citation, brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). 425 F.3d at 106. [Emphasis added]…
“The purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits,” according to Conley, 355 U.S. at
48, and not simply to screen out complaints based on a lack of artful lawyering
before any facts have been discovered, id.
“Ordinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a
plaintiff.” Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 125 (2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.© 2006 West, a Thomson business.
3Franchise & Distribution 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice.”). 425 F.3d at
10.
Rule 8(f) provides that “all
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” This simplified notice pleading standard
relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. “The provisions for discovery are so flexible
and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment so effective,
that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic
issues detected and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open
for the inspection of the court.” 5 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1202, p. 76 (2d ed. 1990).
425 F.3d at 108.
Dubray v. Rosebud Housing Authority, 565 F. Supp. 462
(D.S.D. 1983), citing the U.S. Supreme Court, held that:
A complaint should not be
dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiffs
are entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of their claims. In passing on a
motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the complaint are taken as
admitted, with all such allegations construed favorably to the plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Otherwise stated, the question is whether in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, and with every doubt resolved in their behalf, the complaint states
any valid claim for relief. The court
may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only when the allegations of
the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that they do not have a claim. See 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
& Procedure, Civil, § 1357. 565 F. Supp.
at 465. [Emphasis added].
The system of notice pleading does not require plaintiff to
plead facts or legal theories, and a complaint that sets out a claim for relief
is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss as long as there is any set of
facts, consistent with allegations, under which relief could be granted. Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 973 (1998).
In Lombard’s Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing Inc., 753 F.2d 974
(1985), the 11th Circuit, citing the U.S. Supreme Court, held that:
Under notice pleading the
complaint need only“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 753 F.2d at 975.
Antitrust Allegations
It is quite possible that a franchisee will include federal
and state antitrust allegations in his complaint. As such, it is important to have arguments
ready to defeat a motion to dismiss these counts.
As shown in Twombly, discovery is both appropriate and
mandated to permit a plaintiff to obtain evidence to support his allegations
and to offer evidence to support the claims.
This argument should be used to show that an antitrust count should not
be dismissed until the franchisee has had discovery, provided that he has
properly alleged the antitrust requirements.
The 2d Circuit specifically addressed the issue of pleading
concerning antitrust actions. It held
that:
Antitrust claims are, for
pleading purposes, no different. We have
consistently rejected the argument — put forward by successive generations of
lawyers representing clients defending against civil antitrust claims — that
antitrust complaints merit a more rigorous pleading standard, whether because
of their typical complexity and sometimes amorphous nature, or because of the
related extraordinary burdens that litigation beyond the pleading stage may
place on defendant and the courts. See
Todd, 275 F.3d at 198 [HN7] (“No heightened pleading requirements apply in
antitrust cases.”); George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete Inc. v. Pine Hill
Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977), (rejecting the argument that
“antitrust claims, because of their complexity, must be pleaded with greater
specificity than other claims,” and concluding that “a short, plain statement
of a claim for relief which gives notice to the opposing party is all that is
necessary in antitrust cases, as in other cases under the Federal Rules … [;]
the discovery process is designed to provide whatever additional sharpening of
the issues may be necessary”); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1957) (noting that “it is true that antitrust litigation may be of wide scope
and without a central point of attack, so that defense must be diffuse,
prolonged and costly,” and that “many defense lawyers have strongly advocated
more particularized pleading in this area of litigation,” but concluding that
“it is quite clear that the federal rules contain no special exceptions for
antitrust cases”). Indeed,it has been argued from time to time that antitrust
cases are less suitable candidates for dismissal at the pleading stage than
some other kinds of litigation because evidence of the claimed illegality is
likely to be in the exclusive control of the defendants. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738 (1976), “In antitrust cases, where ‘the proof is largely in the hands
of the alleged conspirators,’ dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample
opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.” (Quoting Poller v.
Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962)). 425 F.3d at 108-09. [Emphasis added].
The 2d Circuit said that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss,
as we have explained, an antitrust claimant must allege only the existence of a
conspiracy and a sufficient supporting factual predicate on which that
allegation is based.” 425 F.3d at
114. Therefore, the mere allegation of
these facts should defeat a motion to dismiss these counts.
The 2d Circuit went on to hold:
Thus, in a regime that
contemplates the enforcement of antitrust laws in large measure by private
litigants, although litigation to summary judgment and beyond may place
substantial financial and other burdens on the defendants, neither the Federal
Rules nor the Supreme Court has placed on plaintiffs the requirement that they
plead with special particularity the details of the conspiracies whose
existence they allege. Cf. Radovich, 352
U.S. at 453-54 (noting that Congress “has provided sanctions allowing private
enforcement of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party,” and that “in the face
of such a policy, this court should not add requirements to burden the private
litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in those laws”). 425
F.3d at 116.
In Levine v. Central Florida. Medical Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538
(1996), the 11th Circuit:
explained that the District
Court had granted a motion for directed verdict “before [the plaintiff] reached
that part of his case involving restraint on competition.” Id. at 829. We criticized the District Court’s premature
ruling and stated that “the better course would have been to defer ruling on
the motions for directed verdict until after [the plaintiff] had presented his
entire Section 1 case.” Id. at 828. 72
F.3d at 1555. [Emphasis added]. A claim for conspiracy to monopolize, on the
other hand, does not require a showing of monopoly power. 72 F.3d at 1556. [Emphasis added].
McCallum v. City of Athens, Ga., 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992),
held that “[a] motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3), is inappropriate in such [antitrust] cases unless the
interstate-commerce claim is patently frivolous.” 976 F.2d at 650. The provisions in the franchise agreement
combined with market share should be able to defeat the motion to dismiss these
counts.
The 5th Circuit in Cliff Food Stores Inc. v. Kroger Inc.,
417F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969), held that:
Summary disposition of
litigation, especially antitrust cases, is disfavored and amendments should be
liberally granted so that all cases may be decided on their merits. Food Basket Inc. v. Albertson’s Inc., 383
F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967). Thus, a motion to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings
alone should rarely be granted. A court must
accept as true all facts that are well-pleaded in the complaint, and it must
view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.
1955). A complaint should not be
dismissed unless there is no possibility that the plaintiff can recover under the
allegations of his complaint.
International Erectors Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & Rental Service,
400 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1968). 417 F.2d
at 205. [Emphasis added].
Based upon the above authorities, if a complaint properly alleges
all aspects of each statute together with the support of the facts specific to
the case, the franchisee should survive a motion to dismiss the complaint.
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About the Author: Mitchell J. Kassoff RSS for Mitchell's articles - Visit Mitchell's website Mitchell J. Kassoff, Esq., (www.franatty.cnc.net) deals exclusively with Franchise matters, has been representing both Franchisors and Franchisees in all matters in all 50 states since 1979. Mr. Kassoff has successfully litigated against Starbucks Coffee Company, Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., Domino’s Pizza LLC, 7-Eleven Inc., The Southland Corporation, Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, Great Wraps, Inc., MaggieMoo’s International, LLC, I Can't Believe It's Yogurt Ltd., Candy Express Franchising Inc., Best Western International Inc., Nissan North America, Inc., Shell Oil Company, Black Entertainment Television Inc., United Airlines Inc., The Hertz Corporation, LaSalle National Bank, United States Internal Revenue Service, Attorney General of the State of New York, Woolworth Corporation, Motiva Enterprises L.L.C., Allegiance Telecom Company Worldwide, Allegiance Telecom of New York Inc., Equilon Enterprises L.L.C., Equiva Trading Company, Venator Group Inc., Public Service Electric & Gas, Brice Foods Inc., Fremont Financial Corporation, and numerous other companies which are not nationally known. Click here to visit Mitchell's website Opposing a Franchisor's Motion Factual Violation Franchise Laws Choice of Forum English |
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