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Should a Franchise Holder Be Allowed to Continue Operating While a Termination Suit Is Pending?
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| Guest post by: Mitchell J. Kassoff |
Article Overview: Should a court issue an injunction ordering a franchisor to allow a franchisee to continue to operate his franchise pending conclusion of trial on charges that a franchise was improperly terminated? The position taken here is that in many cases such relief should be granted.
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Free Download - A Legal Analysis of a Preferred Method of Retail Sales By Mitchell J. Kassoff |
Should a Franchise Holder Be Allowed to Continue Operating While a Termination Suit Is Pending?
The primary argument of the franchisee will be that an
injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm if the injunction is not
granted. A secondary argument is that during this process a franchisor will
earn money from the franchise fees paid by a franchisee, thereby benefiting
from this relationship.
The facts in such cases are usually quite simple. A
franchisor will have terminated a franchise due to an alleged breach of the
franchise agreement. The franchisee will argue that either (a) the breach of
the franchise agreement did not exist or (b) it was de minimis and not worthy
of the drastic step of terminating a franchise. In some cases, a franchisee
will allege that it has been discriminated against.
The franchisee will state that its request is simply that
the court order a franchisor to maintain the
status quo ante while this matter is litigated. The franchisee will
continue in that if the injunctions are not granted, monetary damages will not
suffice and it will be impossible to put a franchisee back in its former
position because it will be impossible to know how much a franchisee would have
made or would have sold at their franchises.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a court must weigh “the
relative harms to the parties” when deciding if an injunction should be issued.
1
In a case in the Eastern District of New York, 2 the
plaintiff dealer filed a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendant distributor from terminating its dealership until the dealer’s suit against
the distributor was concluded. The court concluded that the dealer made a
sufficient showing of irreparable harm if his business were closed.
In a case in the Southern District of New York, 3 plaintiffs
brought an order to show cause why the defendant should not be preliminarily
enjoined from terminating their carrier agreements and from committing other
acts of harassment. The court held:
If the defendant does in fact
terminate the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed. They will
have lost their business and their customers and should they eventually succeed
on the merits of this case, it may be impossible to re-establish the businesses
as going concerns. Such a victory would, indeed, be pyrrhic.
That the court has the power to issue an injunction when the
likelihood that the franchise will be terminated is quite clear. “Many courts
have held that defendants who are or may be guilty of anticompetitive practices
should not be permitted to terminate franchises, leases or sales contracts when
such terminations would effectuate those practices.” This is true even though
“the plaintiff had violated the terms of the franchise or sales agreement and
had given [the] defendant a contractual basis for termination.” 4
In a case in the Eastern District of New York, 5 a
franchisee violated its franchise agreement on several occasions. Finally, the
franchisor threatened to terminate the franchise agreement. The franchisee
filed a complaint in state court seeking a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the franchisor from removing the franchisee from the franchisor’s
reservation system. The temporary restraining order was granted and the
defendant removed the case to the Eastern District, where the court held:
The franchise relationship is
the lifeline of the franchisee’s business; the franchisee’s investment of
capital, time, and effort in promoting the franchisor’s goods or services – to
the general exclusion of competing goods and services – would be irreparably
lost upon termination. Money damages cannot make the franchisee in such
situations whole. See Roso-Lino Beverage
Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 125–26 (2d Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (“The loss of Roso-Lino’s distributorship, an ongoing business
representing many years of effort and the livelihood of its husband and wife
owners, constitutes irreparable harm. What plaintiff stands to lose cannot be
fully compensated by subsequent money
damages.”).
In a Northern District of New York case, 7 the plaintiffs
sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) against a franchisor. The plaintiffs
alleged various causes of action including violations of the New York Franchise
Sales Act, fraudulent inducement to enter into certain asset purchase contracts
and franchise agreements, fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, conspiracy, and detrimental reliance. The court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO, holding that such an order could be granted where
the party could establish irreparable harm and that if the restraining order
was not granted, there was the likelihood of the franchisee being forced into
bankruptcy and suffering irreparable harm, thereby rendering a final judgment
useless. The court found that the balance of equities weighed in favor of the
plaintiffs and granted the TRO for 10 days or until a hearing and determination
of the plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction.
The Southern District of New York 8 has held that the court
must balance the equities to
determine if “the harm which [it] would suffer from the denial of [its] motion
is ‘decidedly’ greater than the harm [Cherokee] would suffer if the motion is
granted.” Buffalo Forge Co. v.
AMPCO-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Roland
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984)
(balance the potential harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is erroneously
denied against the potential harm to the defendant if it is erroneously
granted). 9
The harm that the plaintiff will suffer if the injunctionis
not granted must be analyzed together with the balancing of the equities
between the parties. If the court grants the requested relief, the franchisee
will argue, it will cost the defendant virtually nothing to comply; indeed, the
defendant will make additional money. Therefore, the harm that will be caused
if the relief is not granted is greatly magnified when it is compared with the
zero cost to the defendant.
It should also be noted that all factors are not weighted
equally. The Fourth Circuit 10 stated:
These factors are not, however,
all weighted equally. The “balance of hardships” reached by comparing the
relevant harms to the plaintiff and defendant is the most important
determination, dictating, for example, how strong a likelihood of success
showing the plaintiff must make. See Rum
Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991). 11
The Court of Appeals went on to state:
Even if a loss can be compensated by money damages at
judgment, however, extraordinary circumstances may give rise to the irreparable
harm required for a preliminary injunction. For example, the Seventh Circuit
has noted that even where a harm could
be remedied by money damages at judgment, irreparable harm may still exist
where the moving party’s business cannot survive absent a preliminary
injunction.12
The U.S. District Court in Kansas 13 held:
Plaintiff claims it will be irreparably harmed in several
ways if defendant is allowed to discontinue its monthly supply of PVC compound.
First, plaintiff claims that because the Shintech supply contract provides only
half of its PVC compound requirements it will not be able to meet customer
demands, which are presently very high. Consequently, plaintiff will lose
goodwill and will eventually lose its customers to other PVC pipe manufacturers
able to meet customer demands. Second, the reduction of compound supply will
necessitate plaintiff’s laying off 10–12 employees and curtailing operations
from seven days per week to five days per week on April 1, 1988. Third,
plaintiff will not be able to operate profitably at less than full capacity,
and thus will eventually be forced to cease its manufacturing operations
altogether. Numerous cases support the conclusion that loss of customers, loss
of goodwill, and threats to a business’ viability can constitute irreparable
harm. See Tri-State Generation, 805 F.2d 351, 356 (10th Cir. 1986); Roso-Lino Beverage Distributors, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 125–26 (2d Cir. 1984); Otero Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981); Federal Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, 650 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1981); Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570,
572 (10th Cir. 1980); John B. Hull, Inc.
v. Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 28–29 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 960, 99 S. Ct. 1502, 59 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1979); Semmes Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970); Associated
Producers Co. v. City of Independence, 648 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (W.D. Mo.
1986); Stanley-Fizer Associates, Inc. v.
Sport-Billy Productions Rolf Deyhle, 608 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Great Salt Lake Minerals &
Chemicals Corp. v. Marsh, 596 F. Supp. 548, 557 (D. Utah 1984). 14
Strong notice should be taken of the last line of the quote,
to wit: “Numerous cases support the conclusion that loss of customers, loss of
goodwill, and threats to a business’ viability can constitute irreparable
harm.”
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “where the
status quo is a condition not of rest, but of action, and the condition of rest
(in this case the refusal to deliver the seed corn) will cause irreparable
harm, a mandatory preliminary injunction is proper.” 15
The Southern District of New York 16 described the necessary
elements for an injunction as follows:
To prevail on its claim for a preliminary injunction, [the
moving party] must demonstrate a threat of irreparable injury and either (1) a
probability of success on the merits, or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits of the claims to make them a fair ground for litigation,
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor. See, e.g.,
Brenntag Int’l Chems. Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir.
1999). Although the monetary injury claimed here usually does not constitute
irreparable harm because such injury can be estimated and compensated,
irreparable harm may exist where “but for the grant of equitable relief, there
is a substantial chance that upon final resolution of the action the parties
cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied.” Id. (internal cite omitted); S.E.C. v. Princeton Econ. Int’l, Ltd., 73 F.
Supp. 2d 420, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same). 17
The Second Circuit 18 held:
Unlike a party seeking specific performance, a party that
requests a preliminary injunction must discuss the merits of the dispute
underlying the injunction motion. The requirements for a preliminary injunction
are well settled: a party seeking relief must show (a) irreparable harm and (b)
either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor. Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P.
Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
The test for specific performance is more flexible. It
initially requires proof that (1) a valid contract exists between the parties,
(2) the plaintiff has substantially performed its part of the contract, and (3)
plaintiff and defendant are each able to continue performing their parts of the
agreement. See Travellers Int’l AG v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1087, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). A party
seeking relief must show equitable factors in its favor, for example, the lack
of an adequate remedy at law, and must also demonstrate that its risk of
injury, if the injunction is denied, is one that after balancing the equities
entitles it to relief. Id. One of the factors balanced is irreparable harm, a
common element under both tests. See Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Payroll Express Corp.
v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 659 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1981) (specific
performance injunction granted where money damages speculative and court found
absence of “offsetting equities militating against a grant of equitable
relief”); Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1972) (specific performance
injunction upheld based on contract language and showing of irreparable damage).
19
The franchisee will state that the relief requested is in
reality seeking specific performance of the contract between the parties,
namely the continuation of the contractual relationship among the parties.
There are two tests to determine if a court should grant the
injunctive relief requested by a franchisee.
They are (a) irreparable injury to the moving party and (b)
probable success on the merits of the case or “sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits as to make them a fair ground for litigation.” To succeed,
the plaintiff “need only make a showing that the probability of . . .
prevailing is better than fifty percent.” 20
Some courts add an additional two tests (c) a balancing of
the equities between the parties and (d) the public good. As shown below, not
only are these tests easily passed by the plaintiff, but the balancing of the
equities of the parties is clearly in favor of granting the relief because the
harm to the plaintiff is potentially very significant while the harm to the
defendant is likely to be minimal.
In terms of the public good, the franchisee will argue that
society as a whole will be helped because it is in thepublic interest not to
allow a franchisor to have a franchisee work more than six years to build up a
business and then take it from him. If a large franchisor is permitted to
succeed, it will be encouraged to repeat this behavior in countless other
cases.
As Judge Friendly once remarked, “the opportunity for doing
equity is considerably better than it will be later on.” 21 In addition to
federal law, the law of New York State also supports the franchisee’s position.
The Second Department 22 has held that:
The defendants are clearly attempting to terminate the
plaintiffs’ exclusive licensing agreement and, absent a preliminary injunction,
there is no assurance that the plaintiffs will be able to stay in business
pending trial. Such interference with an ongoing business, particularly one
involving a unique product and an exclusive licensing and distribution arrangement,
risks irreparable injury and is enjoinable (see, e.g., Chrysler Realty Corp. v. Urban Investing
Corp., 100 A.D.2d 921; Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
749 F.2d 124). In the absence of any proof that Carvel will be harmed by the
granting of injunctive relief in order to maintain the status quo, the
existence of disputed factual issues should not preclude the remedy (see,
Burmax Co. v. B & S Indus., 135 A.D.2d 599; City Store Gates Mfg. Corp. v.
United Steel Prods., 79 A.D.2d 671; see
also, CPLR 6301; Blake v. Biscardi, 52 A.D.2d 834; Nassau Roofing & Sheet
Metal Co. v. Facilities Dev. Corp., 70 A.D.2d 1021). 23
In the Third Department, 24 a corporation entered into a
written contract to provide radiology services to a hospital. The contract
provided that either party could terminate the agreement as long as the action
taken was not arbitrary or capricious in nature. The hospital terminated the
agreement in order to reduce the operating expenses of the radiology
department, which had operated at a loss. The corporation sought a preliminary
injunction requiring the hospital to reinstate the corporation pending the trial
of the underlying breach of contract action. The trial court denied preliminary
injunctive relief, but the court reversed. The court held that the moving party
had to demonstrate the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits;
irreparable injury absent granting of the preliminary injunction; and a
balancing of equities. The corporation made a prima facie showing that the
hospital’s action could have been seen as arbitrary or capricious, and
disruption of the corporation’s practice would have resulted in the loss of
good will and patient referrals, which was impossible to ascertain. 25
The Appellate Division reversed the order of the trial court
that denied the corporation’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The
court granted a preliminary injunction directing the hospital to reinstate the
corporation pending the underlying action.
Therefore, both the Second and Third Departments have stated
that the injunctive relief in a situation similar to that of plaintiffs should
be granted.
The Supreme Court, New York County, 26 held:
The claim of irreparable injury
is met with a glib response that money damages would make petitioner whole if
the License Agreement has been wrongfully terminated. This ignores the real threat that termination
poses to the continued existence of Innomed whose only asset is the valuable
sublicense. Furthermore, Innomed has a valuable marketing agreement with
Pfizer, Inc., that would be defeated. This agreement generates substantial
revenues from which royalties on the plastic comb are supposed to be paid to
Comb Associates. Besides, the calculation of petitioner’s damages if the
license passes to another is an exercise in speculation. It is true that part
of these damages will be measured by the actual sales of the new licensee. But,
if those sales could be greater had the license not been terminated, petitioner
would be entitled to a higher sum incapable of measurement. In any event, the
possibility that money damages may be adequate does not prevent injunctive
relief. 27
As a fallback position, a franchisor will attempt to have a
bond imposed upon the franchisee. This can be quite devastating to the
franchisee if it cannot afford the bond fee. The franchisee will submit that
the court should grant the franchisee’s request for injunctive relief without
requiring the franchisee to post a bond. 28
In relevant part, the rule states that
[n]o restraining order or preliminary
injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in
such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages
as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained. 29
The franchisee will state that the franchisor has only benefited
financially from the plaintiffs’ operations of their franchises. In addition,
the clear trend is that since the plaintiffs’ sales have been increasing, the
benefit to the defendant shall only increase.
The language of Rule 65(c) has been held to give the court
“[w]ide discretion to set the amount of a bond, and even to dispense with the
bond requirement ‘where there has been no proof of likelihood of harm.’” 30
The franchisee’s final argument will be that the franchisor
will continue to profit from the franchisee’s efforts. The franchisee will
emphasize that the posting of a bond will be a significant financial hardship
for the franchisee, which it should not be required to endure.
In conclusion, the franchisee will state that based upon the
irreparable harm that the franchisee will have and the lack of harm the
franchisor will have if the court grants the requested injunctive relief, the
injunctive relief requested by the franchisee should be granted. In addition,
the franchisee will state that the requested injunctive relief must be granted
to preserve the status quo ante. Finally, the franchisee will state that should
the injunctive relief not be granted, it will be impossible to properly
compensate plaintiffs at the successful conclusion of the trial.
For the reasons described here, in many cases the injunctive
relief requested by the franchisee should be granted.
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About the Author: Mitchell J. Kassoff RSS for Mitchell's articles - Visit Mitchell's website Mitchell J. Kassoff, Esq., (www.franatty.cnc.net) deals exclusively with Franchise matters, has been representing both Franchisors and Franchisees in all matters in all 50 states since 1979. Mr. Kassoff has successfully litigated against Starbucks Coffee Company, Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., Domino’s Pizza LLC, 7-Eleven Inc., The Southland Corporation, Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, Great Wraps, Inc., MaggieMoo’s International, LLC, I Can't Believe It's Yogurt Ltd., Candy Express Franchising Inc., Best Western International Inc., Nissan North America, Inc., Shell Oil Company, Black Entertainment Television Inc., United Airlines Inc., The Hertz Corporation, LaSalle National Bank, United States Internal Revenue Service, Attorney General of the State of New York, Woolworth Corporation, Motiva Enterprises L.L.C., Allegiance Telecom Company Worldwide, Allegiance Telecom of New York Inc., Equilon Enterprises L.L.C., Equiva Trading Company, Venator Group Inc., Public Service Electric & Gas, Brice Foods Inc., Fremont Financial Corporation, and numerous other companies which are not nationally known. Click here to visit Mitchell's website Dismiss a Franchise Violation Franchise Laws Termination Suit Choice of Forum Federal and State Laws |
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